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H.: Carriers--Uniform Bill of Lading--Liability as Insurer or Warehou
STUDENT NOTES AND BECENT CASES

Court of Appeals, to review each case largely on its merits, rather
than rigidly to fetter the court with prior decisions without regard
to actual justice 716
-M. T. V.
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was an action to recover for an'interstate
shipment of goods consigned under a uniform bill of lading, requiring forty-eight hours, after notice to the owner of arrival, before liability as insurer ceased and that of warehouseman began.
Notice had been given, but the time period for removal had not
expired when the goods were destroyed. Held, the carrier was
liable as insurer for the value of the property. Del Signore v.
Payne, Director General of Railroads. 109 S. H. 232 (W. Va.
1921.)
There are three distinct views as to the liability of a carrier for
loss occurring after arrival and before delivery of a consignment.
The Massachusetts court applies the doctrine that insurance liability, ipso facto, terminates when the shipment arrives at its destination and is placed in the warehouse. Norway Plains v. Boston &
Maine R. Co., 1 Gray 263, 61 Am. Dec. 423. New Hampshire enforces the rule that a reasonable time for removal should elapse
before the carrier is discharged from its extraordinary liability.
Moses v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 32 N. H. 523,64 Am. Dec. 381. The
third rule, enunciated by the New York Supreme Court, holds that
the insurance liability of the carrier continues until the consignee has
been notified of the arrival of the goods, and has had a reasonable
time to take them away after such notification. McDonald v.
Western R. Co., 34 N. Y. 497. The various state courts seem to be
.n irreconcilable conflict as to the application of these rules. Each
doctrine has its advocates, who claim that a certain one represents
the sounder view. A North Carolina case says, "Not only does the
great weight of authority in this country sustain the view of Judge
Cooley (N. Y. rule), but such is the English and Canadian law."
Poythress v. Durham & Southern R. Co., 148 N. C. 391, 62 S. E.
515,18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 427 and note. England applies the rule
requiring notice. Mitchell v. Lancashire etc. R. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B.
256, Chapman v. Great Western R. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. Div. 278.
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The same doctrine is applied by the courts of Canada. Richardson
v. Canadian Pacific R. Co., 19 Ont. 369. The West Virginia court
has consistently adhered to the rule allowing a reasonable time for
removal before changing the liability from insurer to that of warehouseman. Berry v. West Virginia & PittsburghR. Co., 44 W. Va.
538, 30 S. E. 143; Htttchinson v. Express Co., 63 W. Va. 128, 59
S. E. 949; Hurley v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 68 W. Va. 471, 69
S. E. 904; Stefan Annese v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 87 W. Va.
588, 105 S. E. 807. The principal case does not show an intention
to relinquish the established rule in so far as it applies to shipments
not governed by special contract, that is, in the absence of stipulations in the bill of lading providing for notice and a reasonable
time thereafter for removal before limiting the liability to that of
warehouseman. In all jurisdictions, however, the common law
liability of a carrier as insurer is subject to reasonable modification by contract. The question therefore in the principal case is
whether the modification of the common law liability is reasonable
and enforcible. This question has been answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court of the United States in a recent case,
involving the construction of the Uniform Bill of Lading. The
court reached the same conclusion as that given in the principal
case. Michigan CentralR. Co. v. Mark Owen & Co., 65 L. Ed. 690, 41
Sup. Ct. R. 554. Justice McReynolds, dissenting, said, "The Uniform Bill of Lading is in common use, and the opinion of the court
will be far-reaching."
The extended use of the special contract
will probably bring the question before many of the state courts.
Jurisdictions applying the Massachusetts rule might be inclined to
consider the change in degree of liability unreasonable, as the
Uniform Bill of Lading would impose insurance liability for 48
hours after notice, whereas they have only recognized the liability
of a warehouseman. Whatever may be the extent of the application
of the doctrine of the principal case in our own or other jurisdictions, it is submitted that the rule requiring notice and a reasonable
time for removal before changing insurance liability to that of
warehouse liability, is sound and reasonable. It works no hardship
on the carrier to give notice; it does not subject the consignee to
loss for causes over which he has no control; it promotes uniformity
of decisions; and it is more in consonance with equity and justice
between all parties.
-C. P. H.
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